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  Independence	  Ini%a%ve	  
•  Social	  capital	  is	  key	  
•  Current	  welfare	  system	  isn’t	  enough	  
•  Cultural	  groups	  meet,	  set	  personal	  goals,	  and	  
receive	  payment	  for	  achievement	  
•  BoRom-­‐up	  approach	  rather	  than	  Top-­‐down	  
•  Results?	  
–  Increased	  Savings	  240%	  
–  Increased	  Homeownership	  17%	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  Sefng,	  Group	  Mee%ngs,	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Experimental	  Design	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  Group,	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  Prize:	  
14USD	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  of	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3USD	  for	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GROUP	  4	   FII	  MODEL	  
Components:	  	  	  
Goal	  Sefng,	  Group	  Mee%ngs,	  and	  Monetary	  Incen%ves	  
Random	  Assignment,	  Small	  Business	  Owners	  
	  
Survey	  Design	  
•  7	  total	  mee%ngs	  
•  Around	  30	  subjects	  per	  group	  
•  Average	  number	  of	  survey	  ques%ons:	  30	  
•  Based	  on	  recall:	  Min	  4	  weeks,	  Max	  6	  months	  
•  Baseline	  and	  End	  line	  Control	  Group	  
Research	  Ques%ons	  
•  Can	  the	  FII	  Model	  be	  replicated?	  	  If	  so…	  
– Component	  is	  most	  eﬀec%ve	  for	  achievement	  
levels?	  
•  Group	  Sefngs	  
•  Incen%ves	  
– Component	  is	  most	  eﬀec%ve	  for	  improving	  
economic	  outcomes?	  	  
•  Sefng	  a	  goal	  




Means	  (Std.	  Dev.)	  
Control	  
Addt’l	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(1.12)	   -­‐	  
2.45	  
(1.38)	   1	   6	   0.81	  
Self	  Esteem	   3.41	  (0.49)	   -­‐	  
3.47	  
(0.61)	   2.5	   4	   0.91	  
Risk	  Loving	   6.40	  (1.91)	   -­‐	  
6.37	  
(1.83)	   1	   10	   0.66	  
Obs.	   19	   21	   119	   159	  
Educa%on:	  Illiterate=1,	  primary=2,	  high	  school=3,	  associates	  degree=4,	  university	  and	  postgraduate=5	  
Female=1	  	  
Summary	  Sta%s%cs	  
Means,	  (Std.	  Dev.)	  
Control	   Addt’l	  Control	   Treatment	   Min	   Max	   T	  v	  C	  	  P-­‐value	  




(0.96)	   1	   3	   0.11	  
Owns:	  




(0.49)	   0	   1	   0.06*	  




(0.50)	   0	   1	   0.04**	  
Owns	  func0oning:	  




(0.50)	   0	   1	   0.15	  




(0.19)	   0	   1	   0.11	  




(0.15)	   0	   1	   0.21	  




(0.42)	   0	   1	   0.53	  
Observa0ons	   19	   21	   119	   159	  
Econometric	  Model	  (1)	  
•  Probit	  Model	  
•  Es%mate	  overall	  eﬀect	  of	  Groups,	  Incen%ves,	  
and	  the	  FII	  Model	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  goal	  
achievement	  
•  Explana%on	  of	  each	  variable	  
•  Controls	  include	  age,	  educa%on,	  gender,	  and	  
%me	  

Table 9: Marginal Effects for the Probit Model in Table 8	  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES   
  
      
FII Model 0.14**   0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 
  (0.03)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Incentive   0.18*** 0.11** 0.08* 0.10** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Group     -0.04 -0.06* -0.08* -0.06* 
      (0.30) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Risk Level         0.00 
          (0.01) 
Self-Esteem         0.07** 
          (0.03) 
Controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Obs.	   571	   571	   571 571	   571	   563	  
Pseudo R2	   0.04	   0.07	   0.00 0.08	   0.10	   0.11	  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	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Econometric	  Model	  (2)	  
-­‐  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  Model	  
-­‐  Salesvalue	  is	  a	  monthly	  sales	  level	  from	  1	  to	  6	  
-­‐  Es%mate	  overall	  eﬀects	  of	  treatment	  on	  the	  monthly	  
sales	  level	  (measured	  in	  index	  points)	  
-­‐  Controls	  include	  age,	  educa%on,	  gender,	  %me	  and	  
business	  type	  

Table 10: OLS Estimations on Monthly Sales Index	  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES     
FII Model 0.40*** 0.50** 0.58*** 0.57** 
(0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Incentive 0.28*** 0.08 0 0.03 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Goal -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.05 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) 
Group 0.02 -0.21 -0.38** -0.30* 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Risk Level     -0.01 
    (0.03) 
Self-Esteem     0.37*** 
    (0.13) 
Controls No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 817 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: OLS Estimations on Monthly Sales Index	  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES     
FII Model 0.40*** 0.50** 0.58*** 0.57** 
(0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Incentive 0.28*** 0.08 0 0.03 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Goal -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.05 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) 
Group 0.02 -0.21 -0.38** -0.30* 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Risk Level     -0.01 
    (0.03) 
Self-Esteem     0.37*** 
    (0.13) 
Controls No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 817 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Preliminary	  Robustness	  Checks	  
•  Performed	  bivariate	  probit	  models	  by	  gender	  
– Women	  have	  a	  stronger	  impacts	  on	  goal	  
achievement	  than	  men	  
– FII	  Model	  is	  more	  signiﬁcant	  for	  women	  
•  Addi%onal	  checks	  to	  be	  performed	  




•  The	  Family	  Independence	  Ini%a%ve	  CAN	  be	  
replicated	  and	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  
– Higher	  achievement	  levels	  across	  all	  es%ma%ons	  
– Higher	  monthly	  sales	  values	  across	  all	  es%ma%ons	  
•  Most	  successful	  component:	  Incen%ves	  
•  Most	  successful	  combina%on:	  	  
Goal	  Sefng	  +	  Group	  Mee%ngs	  +	  Incen%vized	  Payments	  
	  à	  Improved	  goal	  achievement	  
	  à	  Improved	  economic	  outcomes	  
	  
Thank	  you!	  
•  I	  look	  forward	  to	  your	  sugges%ons	  and	  
comments.	  
